This paper reviews connections between physics and computation, and explores their implications. The main topics are computational "hardness" of physical systems, computational status of fundamental theories, quantum computation, and the Universe as a computer.
Introduction
In the last decade many connections have been discovered between physics and the theory of computation, illuminating both subjects. This paper reviews these diverse connections and explores some
The first section explores the computational 'budness" of physical systems --the difficulty of predicting the evolution of a dynamical system, or more generally the result of an experiment, to various degrees of aauracy. We will deal with results from classical dynamical systems and the classical theory of computational complexity (time and space complexity), and then explore some more speculative connections involving quantum-mechanical systems and the algorithmic information theory of Kolmogorov and Chaitin, with implications for the foundations of mathematics. We will discuss Church's thesis and define and assess several complexity-theoretic analogueS.
of their implications.
Section II deals with the computational status of fundamental quantum field theories, especially Quantum Electrodynamics (QED). The dSiculties in formulating these theories on a sound algorithmic basis are examinad and some related mathematical issues are treated 'xhe third section of the paper =views recent work in Quantum Computation by Feynman and others and the implications for complexity theory.
In the final section we discuss the question "Is the Universe a Computer?", an a€6nnative answer to which has been argued by Fredkin and Toffoli, and the more general question 'Why is computation (as we know it) possible?".
I.
Computational "Hardness" of Physical Systems A. What does it mean to "solve" a dynamical system?
In the last century much effort was spent trying to find "closed form" solutions for dynamical systems. The classical example was tbe "n-body problem", in which a system of n point masses obeying an inverse square law of attraction is to be "solved. The ultimate objective was to prove that the solar system was stable for some suitable notion of stability.
But what is the meaning of "closed form solution"? Originally, it meant that the dynamical variables could be expressed as a function of the initial conditions and time, where the function involved was a "known" function. The repertoire of "known" functions included trigonometric and exponential functions and was augmented over the years by "special functions" such as the gamma function, Airy and Bessel functions, elliptic functions, and so on, as well as any fundion obtainable from these by standard operators such as differentiation, integration, and functional composition and inversion. Ideally, the value of a variable at a given time could be obtaioed by "plugging in" the initial conditions and t to the function. nothing about what happens after that.
In the n-body problem, there are 10 classical "constants of the motion", also known as "first integrais", corresponding to the laws of conservation of energy (1 integral), momentum (6 integrals), and angular momentum (3 integrals). When n=2, this reduces the system to one which can be solved explicitly.
The change of variables will not, in general, be given by a well-known function, but will presumably be fairly smooth and computable. Again, the point is that after the htial change of variables the solution is a simple function easily computed for all t.
The use of the word "integrable" here is interesting. The correct analogy is not with a memann) integrable function from R to R, but with a function "integrable" in the freshman calculus sense: f can be "integrated if you can find an antiderivative which can be evaluated at the endpoints of the interval, avoiding tedious numerical integration.
From the perspective of modem computation theory, what was sought for, say, the n-body problem, was a practical way of computing the state of the system at time t for given initial conditions. They certainly knew how to compute this by numerical integration, but numerical integration is slow. It requires computational resources (running time for a single processor, or running time * number of processors for a parallel computation) propodonal to t Actually, the resources required for a numerical integration might be even greater, say (t * log t), because of the computational overhead involved in keeping track of the computation and bounding round-off error.
In principle, the "running time" (in a broader sense) is never going to exceed t asymptotically for many dynamical systems because you can just set up the system and watch it evolve. The types of systems for which such a Simulation is possible have been investigated by Pour-El and Richards ["Abstract Computability and its relation to the General-Purpose Analog Computer", Transactions of the A.M. S. 199 (1974), 1-28] .
In addition to computing where the system is at lime t, one might want to know some long-term qualitative feature of its behavior, such as whether a certain region of the phase space will ever be visited for a given initial condition. In an n-body problem, the question might be whether there is a "gravitational escape", where one of the "planets" moves arbitrarily far away from the others as t goes to infinity. lhis type of question is straightforward for an integrable system, when the "first integrals" are computable easily, but difficult in general because a numerical integration will only take you out to time t but tell you For the n-body problem with n > 2, Poincare showed [Acta Math., 11 (1887) l that the classical integrals corresponding to energy, momentum, and angular momentum are the only ones. Thus the solar system (in the Newtonian approximation) is not an "integrable system" and there is no "solution" to the n-body problem in the classical sense.
However, just because a system isn't integrable does not mean that there is no practical way of "solving" it computationally. Let us make some definitions: Definition.
A dynamical system is "weakly computationally solvable" if there is a Turing machine algorithm to compute the values of the dynamical variables as a function of the initial conditions and time, such that the running time of the algorithm is o(t). It is "strongly computationally solvable" if there is such an algorithm whose running time is polynomial in (log t). ("Compute the values of the dynamical variables" means provide arbitrarily many decimal places of these real numbers, asking for additional digits of precision of the initial conditions as necessary.)
?he first notion of solvability says that the system can be "speeded up": there is a way to predict the behavior of the system faster than simply watching it go. The second notion says that the prediction algorithm is a feasible computation in the sense that the running time is polynomial in the size of the input data (to specify the time t requires an amount of information proportional to log t). This implies, of course, that only a polynomial amount of information is needed to specify the initial conditions precisely enough: see the remarks on chaotic systems, below.
(Remark: The identification of "polynomial-time computation" with "feasible computation" is slightly conmversiaL An qn*lOO) computation may not be very feasible in practice, and the recognition of prime numbers is considered a feasible problem even though it has only been shown to be in "random polynomial time". Since all known non-contrived polynomial-time problems actually have fairly low-degree polynomial algorithms, and since "random polynomial time" is almost certainly equal to "polynomial time" [J. Shipman, "Why P=R is emmely likely to be true", in preparation], we will treat "feasible" and "polynomial-time" as synonymous. End of remark.) Definition. A dynamical system is "computationally predictable" if there is an algorithm which, given an initial condition and a region of phase space, decides whether or not the resulting rrajectov ever passes through that region (and always halts except when the trajectory passes through the region's boundary but not its interior, in this exceptional case the algorithm would have to ask for infinitely many bits if it were to perform conectly for nearby initial conditions). This is a strong condition. It means that you can say something about the behavior of the system for all time, not just compute where it is at any given time. The 2-body problem is computationally predictable because the orbit structure is completely understood. This condition is not meaningful for ergodic systems, where almost all trajectories are dense in the phase v=.
In principle, dynamical systems which are not integrable may still be computationally solvable or pxedictable. The famous Kolmogomv-hold-Moser theorem states that for sufficiently small and smooth perturbations of an integrable Hamiltonian system, most trajectories remain confined to "invariant tori", behaving in a "quasi-periodic" fashion. Noser, "On the theory of quasi-periodic motion", SIAM Review (R%6)]. For this type of system it is often possible to say something about the long-term behavior (mmputational predictability) and achieve a speedup in computing the behavior over a finite time interval (computational solvability). The important question is whether the perturbation is small enough that the KAIvl theorem applies: this is often difficult to prove, so that in practice it may be very hard to achieve these computational goals. For example, h o l d has shown that for sufficiently small planetary masses and orbital etxenmcities and inclinations the motion of an n-body gravitating system is quasiperiodic for most initial conditions, but his theoretical bounds are exceeded in tlne case of our own solar system. [ h o l d , "Small denominators and problems of stability of motion in classical and celestial mechanics", Uspehi Mat. Nauk, 18 (113) (1963) Any system which contains somewhere in its phase space a region which after some time interval is stretched, folded, and mapped back into itself as in the "horseshoe" diagram contains an invariant Cantor set on which the dynamics is chaotic. In particular, each point on the Cantor set can be given an "address" consisting of a two-sided infinite binary sequence (see diagram 2), {Diagram 2 : invariant Cantor set) so that the horseshoe map (equivalent to letting system evolve for a fixed time intend) acts on the address as the "shift map":
... a, a-z a-, . a, , a, %...-->...a, a-, a, .a, a, a, ....
Clearly such a system is not "computationally solvable", since you need an amount of inital data proportional to t to determine where the system is at time t. On the other hand, the system (restricted to the invariant Cantor set) is pivially easy to simulate: to tell where a point will be n time units from now (the unit is the length of the time interval involved in defining the horseshoe map), simply shift the "address" of the point left by n bits. It is not much more difficult to compute the behavior at non-integral times, because you can numerically integrate the flow over the fractional part of the time interval after doing the shift this numerical integration takes a constant amount of time for all t (for a given amoant of precision in the answer).
The system is not "computationally predictable" because to tell whether a certain region of the phase space is ever visited corresponds to knowing whether a certain bit sequence occurs ANYWHERE in the "address" of a point. For an arbitrary initial point which you are given one bit at a time, tbere is no way to tell except by continuing to look until you see the sequence, but if it isn't there you'll never know for sure. For particular initial conditions which are known EXACI'LY, such as a point w i t h rational coordinates (both bit sequences a, a, ... and a, a, h... are eventually periodic), on the other hand, the question of whether a particular region of phase space will be visited can be easily answered.
Although the type of system described above is chaotic, it is not complex: the dynamics are given by a very simple map. The computation of a trajectory cannot be speeded up, but the structure of the dynamics (identifymg periodic points and basins of attraction, finding the rate of divergence of trajectories) may well be easy to compute. Although chaotic systems may contain Cantor-set-like (or "fractal") "strange attractors", these features are often easy to define computationally. The long-term behavior of such a system may be easy to predia (in particular, the attractors and b a s h of attraction can be defjned and computed).
C. Even harder systems: computational

incompressibility.
A standard result in the theory of computation is that arbitrary computations cannot be "speeded up". In particular, the function f(i,t) "whether machine i (started on a blank tape) halts after running for t time steps" cannot be computed by any T d g machine whose running time is dt One way of constructing such a system is by modeling, riot Turing machine computations, but "counter machine" computations. A Turing machine can be thought of as a finite-state machine with a memory consisting of words in some alphabet (for a 1-tape Turing machine which uses the binary alphabet, the two "words" are the tape to the left and to the right of the currently scanned square, up to the outermost "1"). me permitted operations are reading, adding, deleting, or changing the letter at the beginning of a word (and branching &pending on what the letter is).
A "counter machine" is simply a Turing machine with a unary alphabet In other words, it is a finite-state machine with a memory consisting of a number of registers, each of which contains not a word in some alphabet, but a non-negative integer. The permitted operations are adding or subtracting one to a register, and testing whether it contains "zero". ("Subtracting one" from a register which is already 0 leaves it unchanged.) Counter machines can do everything Turing machines can do, but more slowly.
It is simple to simulate a Turing machine by a 3-counter machine: the 6rst two counters represent the tape, "decoded" U binary to unary. Inserting, deleting, or reading the first letter of half the tape correspond to doubling, halving, and parity-testing the integer in the corresponding counter. These operations are easily performed by using the third counter to keep tm& In fact, a 2-munter machine will suffice In another paper [J. Shipman, "Robust undecidability in systems with finitely many degrees of freedom", in preparation] I will show how to define a dynamical system with finitely many degrees of freedom which simulates a 3-counter machine. The "memory" is represented not by the bits of the dynamical variables, but by the positions of certain particles. A register containing the integer n is represented by a particle "n units away". Checking or changing the value of a register involves sending out a "test pdcle" and takes time proportional to the value, rather than unit time, so then! is a "quadratic" slowdown on tap of the exponential slowdown that comes from simulating a Turing machine with a counter machine.
Although no general way to exponentially speed up the behavior of counter machines is known, the system described above is certainly "strongly computationally solvable" because its behavior can be so greatly speeded up by running the corresponding Turing machine instead-However, for an appropriate Turing machine the "counter machine system" is computationally unpredictable because the counter machine halts if and only if the corresponding Turing machine does, so the "t -> infinity" questions are just as manswerable as for the systems described in M o o r e ' s paper.
D. Hardest of all: Noncomputability
Are there system which m o t be computationally simulated at all? The strong version of Church's thesis says that any mathematid function that we can "compute" by some physically realizable setup can be computed by a Turing machine. It is hard to see how a dynamical system specified by differential equations could NOT be tracked by a numerical integration, unless the functions in the formulation were already noncomputable (ie. if one of the coefficients involved was a noncomputable ~e a l number). This doesn't seem physically plausible.
If we don't restrict ourselves to classical dynamical systems the possibiIities axe moce interesting. For example, Pour-El and Richards r'Noncomputability in analysis and physics". Adv. Math 48 (1983) 44-741 have shown that the wave equation with "computable" initial data can have a "noncomputable" solution where the term "computable" here refers to real functions rather than integer functions. However, this doesn't lead to a violation of Church's thesis because their result does not lead to any physically realizable experiments (one would have to somehow specify initial conditions to inhite precision).
A big problem in attempting to show a physical system is "noncomputable" in some appropriate sense is the inherent uncertainty in our knowledge of physical constants. When the mathematical formulation of the system depends on physical constants whose value is empirically determined rather than dehed from Grst principles, the precision of the predicted result depends on tbe precision to which the constants have been measured Theoretically, this issue can be addressed by defining the "experiment" to include a procedure for measuring these constants to the precision necessary. Unfortunately, those procedms may ultimately depend on other physical constants, so that you end up having to include more and more complication in the "experiment". It may be possible to stop this process at same h i t e point, where each of the constants involved depends on the others in some measurable way and a "bootstrapping" process allows simultaneous increases in the precision to which they all are known [J. Shipman, "A theory of 'bootstrapping' greater precision in measuring physical constants", in preparation].
Another issue is whether "arbitmy precision" is physically realistic. If we want an experiment to give us an outcome that involves a "noncomputable number" as the value of some physical quantity, it has to be a quantity that is meaningful to arbitrarily higb precision, because any finite amount of information can be coded into a Turing machine's program.
However, it seems unlikely that "classical" physical quantities like length and electric charge can be meaningfully interpreted as having arbitrary precision, in view of the atomic nature of matter and the uncertainty principle. This suggests several points:
(1) We should deal with quantum systems rather than classical systems, because classical theories are approximations already and we should be dealing with the fundamental scale of matter and the uncertainty principle directly.
(2) We should look at systems containing only a few particles, so that we can specify the situation as exactly as possible and avoid approximations.
(3) The numbers we are measuring should be "dimensionless", since the numerical values of quantities which have a "unit" attached depend on physical constants and are diflicult to interpret to arbitmy precision.
Dimensionless numbers ultimately come down to ratios or probabilities. In the last analysis, something must be counted, for example the number of times a particle which has two possible decay modes decays in each mode. The half-life of a radioactive atom is not dimensionless (it is expressed in seconds), but the ratio of a half-life to another half-life or the period of an atomic clock is, and we can obtain more bits of precision by repeating the experiment. There is no a priori limit on the number of bits we can obtain, although we would have to perform a trillion "experiments" rather than a million to get 20 bits of precision because of the statistical fluctuations. Counting the number of decays in a sample of a mllion atms may be difficult, but in principle there is no problem.
Going back to the issue of noncomputability, we can say that a physical system is "noncomputable" if there is some welldefined procedure for extracting arbitraril) many bits of "information" from the system, such that the sequence of bits cannot be produced by any Turing machine. (It may be necessary to add a condition that the sequence is only obtained with some non-zero probability. In the case of a pure probability p, the rule "perform 2"(2.ln+10) mals before estimating the nth bit of p" guarantees a very good chance that fluctuations will never lead to the wrong answer.) The existence of a sequence not obtainable by a Turing machine is a standard result of computation theory; a famous example is Chaitin's number -0-(Omega), representing the probability that a particular universal Turing machine halts (treating ~e contents of the semi-infinite input tape as the binary expansion of a real number between 0 and 1, -0-is tbe measure of the set of input tapes which cause halting).
[See G. It is interesting to imagine how a non-computable real number (bit sequence) could arise in a physical theory. Noncomputable bit sequences are usually defined as -"recmively enumerable but not recursive" ("renotrec" is the ugly but standard abbreviation) sets, such as the set of TM's which halt (on blank input), the set of Diophantine equations with a solution, or the set of finite presentations of the trivial group (all with some standard coding into the set of natural numbers). These sets all have the property that anything in them tan be reliably identified by a standard procedure, but non-elements may be impossible to definitively reject because any procedure which rejects only non-elements fads to halt on some inputs. Thus, you can run a TM rmtil it halts, ~IY out solutions to a Diophantine equation until you find one, and systematically generate all words equal to the identity element until you find that the group's generators are, but these e n t e r p w are doomed to go on forever in cases where the desired property doesn't hold.
All known non-contrived instances of Fnotrec sets are recursively equivalent to the halting problem (and hence to each other), so it doesn't matter too much which we use if all we are interested in is the fact of their nonmputability. (It is also possible to define even harder sets, such as the set of TM's which halt on ALL inputs, which are not even recursively enumerable, but renouec sets will suffice for our purposes). In terms of practical usefulness there is a big difference: from the first n bits of -0-we can derive the halting behavior of the first 2*n TM's, but very, very slowly, while the first 2*n bits of an oracle for the halting problem solve this immediately. Thus, for renotrec sets there is a tradeoff between information density and "decoding time". (Also of practical importance is whether the number is available directly, as an "oracle" where getting another bit isn't much extra work, or indirectly, as a probability which must be estimated, with each successive bit costing two or even four times as much as the last one).
So how might a renotrec set enter into a physical theo~y? It's hard to see how Turing machine halting might be relevant Diophantine equations look more promising, especially since it is known that we can restrict ourselves to Diophantine equations of bounded degree and dimension and still get renotrec sets: in particular, there is a "universal Diophantine equation" [U Davis, "Computability and Unsolvability", Dover Publications 19821. However, I don't h o w of any argument for the direct physical relevance of Diophantine equations.
A better candidate is the p u p isomorphism problem, of which the group triviality problem mentioned above is a special case (they are both equivalent to the halting problem). It is well-known that any finitely presented group can be obtained as the fundamental group of a compact &manifold; hence, telling whether two compaa &manifolds are homeomorphic is at least as hard as telling whether two finitely presented groups are isomorphic, and in fact recognizing whether &manifolds are homeomoqhic is equivalent to the halting problem. [A. Markov, "Insolubility of the problem of homeomorphy", Proc. Just because dmanifolds can't be classified doesn't mean we won't fincl some clever way to add things up "all at once". The fact that the obvious try doesn't work doesn't imply that a (mathematically well-defined) sum is indeed non-computable. On the other hand, it might be possible to prove such a thing if there is a suitable computable "modulus of convergence" for the sum: use of this and an oracle for the value of the sun^ might allow one to distinguish between two otherwise-indistinguishable 4-rnanifolds by deducing that the sum re@ contributions from both of them and therefore they could not be homeomorphic. This is very speculative, and much work needs to be done, but it certainly seems logically possible that a number h m a physical theory may have a mathematical definition that allows us to prove it's a nonunnputable but experimentally accessible number, and hence falsifies church's thesis.
It is important to note that the philosophical significance of such a result does NOT depend on our being able to get arbitrarily many bits of information out of a system. As Chaitin has pointed out ["Godel's Theorem and Information", Int. J. Theor. Phys., December 19821, for any mathematical axiom system, any definable but noncomputable bit sequence embodies truths not obtainable within the system (for if the value of each bit were derivable within the system, the algorithm "generate all proofs until the value of the bit is settled" would compute the sequence, conuadidng its noncomputability). Thus, for each noncomputable sequence there is some bit whose value is not sealed by the ZFC axiom system, and we only have to go out this far with our physics experiments to derive a "new mathematical truth" unobtainable by purely mathematical investigation. Chaitin has also derived explicit bounds on the information impfiat in axiom systems, in particular giving an upper bound on the number of bits of -0-ZFC can determine.
Geroch and W e propose that a criterion for evaluating a physical theory ought to be that all its measurable numbers are computable; such theories are to be preferred, in the same way that theories which are simple, general, and "elegant" are preferred They feel that a theory whose measurable numbers are not computable would represent an "inconvenience" but that it would still be possible to test the theory against experiment: "predictions are always in principle available. It is just that ever increasing degrees of sophistication would be necessary to extract those predictions. The prediction process would never become routine." In saying this, they are making the assumption that mathematics, with sufficiently many "new ideas", can provide ever-increasing knowledge about a non-computable set.
However, this implies that the reasoning processes involved go beyond any given axiom system. In particular, once the genedy accepted mathematical In the absence of a mathematically tractable "Theory of Everything", which would allow us to do things like define the fine-structure constant from first principles, the prospect of extracting a non-computable number (bit sequence) from physical experiments seem remote. Nonetheless, the logical possibility of doing so tells us some things about our universe, as we will see in the last section of this paper. However, the problem with QED is deeper than this.
II. The Computational
Even if we assume a particular value for this constant, uncertainty enters in another way. Technically, each cmfficient in the power series is a sum of terms obtained from "Feynman diagrams", which are -topologically distinct ways in which the event in question can occur, involving the emission and reabsorption of "virtual particles", and so on. The coefficient for the nth term in the power series is a sum over all the Feynman diagrams involving 2n
couplings. The calculated value of the magnetic moment of the electron referred to above came from a calculation which looked at all diagrams with up to six couplings; this gave three t e r n of the Fower series. The calculation of the third term involved about 70 diagrams; Feynman says that a calculation of tlhe fourth term deals with over 900 eight-coupling diagrams.
Furthennore, the calculation of the contribution of a particular diagram is extremely involved. Tbeoretically, it is supposed to represent an integral over the function space of all "paths" with the topology of the diagram, but there are great mathematical CRifficulties in defining this integral without having it come Out equal to infinity. The problem was that as the "coupling points" approached zero separation, terms blew up. In 1948-49 Feynman, Schwinger, and Tomonaga proved that if the integral is only added up over "paths'~ whose coupling points get no closer together than a certain cutoff distance, consistent predictions of experimental results can be obtained (the intermediate numbers depend on the cutoff distance, taut in the limit the predictions of experimental results do not). This process is called "renormalization", and it gave a well-defined way to assign a number to each Fkynman diagram; the calculation of this number is still very complicated, involving about a hundred thousand terms for an eight-coupling diagram.
'I& explains the uncenainty in the theoretical predictions of QED (over and above the uncertainty in tyle value of the he-structure constant): the computer calculations axe so massive that mund-off error limits tyle precision we can practicably achieve.
However, the real problem with QED is even deeper than this. What we actually have is a sequence of adgorithms: the nth algorithm computes the first n terms of the power series, adding up the contributions of Feynman diagrams up to order 2n, using the complicated process of renormalization. But we do not know if this sequence of algorithms gives a converging sequence of predictions! Physicists call each additional tern a "correction" to the previous sum, and these t e r n have been getting smaller because the extra power of the fine-struaure constant (about 1/137) mote than compensates for the iocrease in the number of diagrams considered. But there is no reason to suppose that the terms will not eventually grow without bound: the number of Feynman diagrams of order 2n grows faster than the nth power of any constant. @I particular, the number of diagrams of order 1002 certainly is a lot more than 137 times the number of diagrams of order 1ooO; the actual growth function must be at least factorial in n.) Thus we have a power series which probably does not converge. It is reasonable to suppose that at some point, as we calculate to higher and higber orders, the power series terns will start increasing in size and our predictions will begin to diverge from experiment. We will have reached the limits of the theory. The mystery is why it works so well at these low orders! The mathematical diflticulty here should not be confused with the problems of "renormalization". Although renormalization, which Feynman calls a "dippy process", is hard to jusafy in terms of the mathematics of function spaces, there is no question that it gives a well-defined combinatorial method to obtain numerical answers. Attempts 
B. Other Fundamental Theories
The situation for other "fundamental" physical theories is even worse. ?he "next best" fundamental theory we have is the elemweak theory, a unification of the electromagnetic and weak interactions developed by Glashow, Salam, and Weinberg in the 1970's. Without getting into too many details, we can say that the theory is of the same general type as QED, although the mathematics is more complicated because it is a "non-Abelian gauge field theory" (in this terminology, QED is an Abelian gauge field theory). There are many more "free parameters" which must be measured experimentally (the only free parameter in QED is the fine-structure constant, although you must also build in the muon/elemm mass ratio if you wish to apply tbe theory to muons and the tau/electron ratio as well to apply the theory to the tau lepton). Because of these free parameters and the mathematical complications, the electroweak theory is not nearly as precise as QED. Its greatest success has been the prediction of the masses of the W and Z intermediate vector bosons, which experiments showed to be c o m a to about one part in 40 or 50.
The electroweak theory is hampered by its abundance of free parameters, for some of which (for example tbe mass of the "Higgs boson") there is no theoretical and little experimental information on their size. (In tbe case of the Higgs boson all we know is that we haven't seen it yet, so if it exists its energy is probably higher than we've been able to reach with our particle accelerators.) On the other hand, predictions aad successive refinements of the parameters are possible: the parameters our experiments are sensitive to are the ones we can gradually measure more precisely. The process of bootstrapping greater sensitivity in our measurements and predictions wiU lead to either continual refinement, falsification of the theory, or an experimental impasse [this trichotomy is explored m more detail in the "bootstrapping" paper mentioned in section I-D]. Even if everything goes well, tbe same mathematical problems which were seen to threaten QED will ultimately limit the elernweak theory, because the calculations still come down to Feynman diagrams and there is no reason to suppose that the answers will stabilize as we move to more and more detailed calculations.
The theory of the strong nuclear interaction, "Quantum chromodynamics" (QCD), explains nuclear phenomena in terms of particles called quarks and gluons. Here tbe computational situation is much worse: the theory does not lend itself to computation by perturbative expansion in powers of some coupling constant, because the coupling constants would be greater than 1 so that the terms wouldn't even decrease for a while before starting to blow up. By qualitative and analogical reasoning and ad hoc approximations, some predictions can be made, but there is no systematic procedure. The fact that the ad hoc stuff works fairly well much of the time is encouraging, but until theoretical advances are made QCD must be regarded as a descriptive rather than a predictive theory.
The best numbers have come from "lattice gauge theories": approximations to QCD in which spacetime is regarded as a discrete lattice and all interactions are discretize& Ian The most ambitious fundamental theories of all are the ones which try to unify gravity with the other fundamental interactions. These "theories of everything" (TOES) share some common mathematical features, especially a "supersymmeay" between bosons ;md fermions, which leads to a cancellation of infinities and (theoretically) h i t e answers for calculations of physical quantities. None of these theories can
compute anythmg yet, but the mathematical requirements a consistent quantum theory of gravity must satisfy are so restrictive that there is hope the ultimate theory will have very few free parameters (at most one or two) and actually be able to explain numbers like the fine-structure constant and particle rnass ratios. As we saw above, some of the numbers a TOE predicts may be noncomputable; before this can be investigated the theorists must !ind a TOE that is mathematically consistent Many physicists are skeptical of the enterprise, which is occupying dozens of physicists and mathematicians. If it .succeeds, and a truly d-encompassing, mathematically consistent theory is discovered, we will be in a better position to assess Church's thesis and the role of computation in the Universe.
(2. What Can Be Proved?
We have seen that the fundamental theories of physics a r e not very computationally satisfactory. There are several ways in which the situation could be clarified
We will discuss them in the context of QED, but the same possibilities apply to other theories, including potential Theories of Everything.
(1) Someone might prove that the sequence of algorithms described in section 2-A converges. This would be a great advance in mathematics as well as physics, but it seems unlikely. Such a proof would give us great confidence in QED's "rightness" ("See? Against all odds, the terms cancel. This must be the real thing."). Of come, it can be proved that for each m, the algorithm to compute the first n terms of the perturbation series converges (this is what Feynman, Schwinger, and Tomonaga essentially did) --see, for example, Bjorken and Drell's text "Relativistic Quantum Fields". The proof depends on some standard results from mathematical analysis (e.g. the Heine-Bore1 theorem). But which n shall we take for our final algorithm, and why?
(2) Someone might prove that the sequence diverges, identifying the point beyond which the terms get larger. Then we would be forced to Cut ourselves off at some finite n and say "this is THE algorithm"; we would have reached the limit of accuracy of QED.
Experiments aimed to be more precise than QED will tell us something new about the world, and other e:xpe&ents will have to take QED's proven margin of error into account. 
D. How Real Are Real Numbers?
Many of the mathematical problems with physical theories result from the use of real numbers and the concomitant assumption that infinitely many decimal places are meaningful. Feynman, in the paper cited above, says it seems strange that an infinite amount of information should be required to specify what is going on in a finite region of space-time. Given the quantum nature of matter and the uncertainty principle, it seems unlikely th-at our theories can give any meaning to distances below the Planck length of about lw-35) m, and the same is true for other physical quantities. Even "dimensionless" numbers like the Gne-structure constant may not "really" (by which I mean Platonically, in the mind of God) exist to infinite precision if we live in a finite universe, unless there is a mathematical definition for them and the ultimate Theory of Everything has no free parameters.
Criticism of the "completed infinite" goes back to Kronecker, and before him to Gauss. The key question, from our point of view, is whether physical theories can be formulated from a computational viewpoint without requiring the logical and set-theoretical assumptions of classical mathematics.
One sense in which this can be done is by denying infinities of any sort, completed or potential, and mating the Universe as if it we= a lattice of space-time points or a cellular automatoa. As remarked above, this is philsophically pleasant but there are reasons for believing that the Universe really is not like that Another viewpoint, which we have adopted-implicitly so far, is to restrict our focus to algorithms and avoid speculation about what is "really" going on. Unfortunately, we are still in the position of having to prove, with the mathematical tools at hand, that our algorithms converge and give consistent results. Also, the algoritbms themselves were formulated from physical theories based on real numbers, and we must either abandon their connection to these theories and all the "physics" which informed their creation, leaving us rootless, or accept the mathematical and philosophical problems that come with the theories. A more ambitious program is to recast physical theories in the spirit of constructive mathematics [see
E. Bishop's great text, "Foundations of Constructive
Analysis", McGraw-Hiu 19671; algorithms (or "constructive procedures") will be built in from the sm, and every statement asserted will have "constructive content". In analogy with the term "continuum", which denotes the locus where classical analysis takes place, H. Resnikoff has proposed the term "Arithmeticum" (originally coined by R 0.
Wells, Jr.) for the place where we do a kind of analysis in which arithmetic plays a central role. In his paper "Foundations of Arithmeticum halysis: Compactly Supported Wavelets and the Wavelet Group" [Aware, Inc. 19901 , he says 'The Arithmeticurn is, we think, the natural domain for analysis mediated by digital computation and, as such, it is also the source of natural models for representing physical phenomena which can be directly observed and measured".
Resnikoff has initiated a program to "arithmetize analysis from the perspective of digital computation". A major tool has been the "compactly supported wavelets" --compactly supported complete orthonormal systems of functions in L*2(R). Some wavelet bases have the interesting property that although the functions are continuous and easily calculable on the dyadic rational numbers (by a recursion which lends itself very naturally to digital computation), they are nowhere differentiable. Continuous, nowhere differentiable functions have been known since WeieIstrass but have been considered "pathological"; their appearance in the theory of wavelets suggests that the "pathology" really stems from taking something which is naturally defined on a dyadx grid and extending it to arbitrary real numbers. The computations only pay attention to the dyadic points, so why bring in all the rest?
All this goes to show is that the real number continuum we are familiar with is not necessarily the best place to do mathematical analysis if we want to compute things. 'Ik reformulation of physical theories in computational terms " h m the ground up" (that is, using constructive mathematics) is hereby proposed; it would be premature to speculate on where this could lead, but as we have seen, the problems with the current formulations are so significant that any attempt to resolve or avoid them is worthwhile.
III. Quantum Computation
In the last section we approached quantum physics from a computational perspective. Now we will look at computation from the viewpoint of quantum mechanics. In particular, what happens if our "computers" are not Turing machines, but quantum mechanical devices?
A "quanm computer" is a device whose physical behavior is modeled by the laws of quantum mechanics, which can be prepared in a discrete set of "input" states (specifiable by a finite set of integers), and which has associated with it a set of discrete observables called "outputs", which may or may not commute with each other. There have been two serious attempts to define and analyze quantum computers, by Deutsch ["Quantum theory, the Churcb-Turing principle and the universal quantum compte$"' Proc. Roy. Soc. Lond. A400 (1985) , pp. Both Feynman and Deutsch specify their quantum computers abstractly, and their constructions resemble Turing machines. Their computers are systems with a !kite "central processor" and an unspecified number of "memory elements", which are two-state quantum systems (Feynman calls them "atoms" but they could be spin-l/2 particles like electrons as well). The memory elements are arranged in a sequence, akin to a Turing machine's tape. There are internal variables corresponding to the location of the currently scanned tape location (Feynman calls it the "cursor") and a special "halt bit" which is 0 at the beginning of the computation and is set to 1 if and when the computation halts.
'Ihe dynamics is generated by a unitary operator, which depends on which Turing machine is being simulated; because "universal Turing machines" which can simulate all other TM's exist, it is really only necessary to specify one such operator. Deutsch gives an existence proof, but Feynman actually constructs the Hamiltonian operator by showing how various "logic gates" can be built up from very simple primitive operators (and quoting results on how to build a universal computer from logic gates). There seems to be no reason, in principle, why a quantum computer along the lines of Feynman's model could not be built These quantum computers operate like Turing machines (e.g. the "cursor position" only changes by one unit at a time and the corresponding memory element is the only one which might get flipped), but there is one interesting constraint on them. Classical computers (and Turing machines) are irreversible: information can be erased and the "previous configurafion" cannot necessarily be deduced from the current configuration.
A unitary evolution is reversible: it must be possible for the computation to go backwards! Fonunately, Fredkin and Toffoli (and before them C. Bennett) have shown that universal computation can be performed in a logically reversible fashion: it is possible to wzy along "garbage bits" without erasing them or having them grow too numerous, so that at any point the entire history of the computation can be recovered. Fredkin and Toffoli ["Conservative Logic", Int. J. Theor. Phys 21 (1982) , 219-2533 have shown how to build a Universal computer from reversible logic gates, keeping the garbage bits under control and getting rid of them at the end Since the computation can go backwards as well as forwards there must be a way to ensure that the computation goes in the right direction. Feynman has shown how this can be done by applying an external force that pulls the cursor along, or by preparing the system with the cursor having different amplitudes to be on different sites representing a "spin wave packet" with a nonzero momentum. The "halt bit" is measured and if it is 1 then the answer to the computation can be read off from the memory observables. It is necessary to test the halt bit fim in order to avoid interfering with an incomplete computation. 
Miniaturization:
The most obvious advantage of quantum computers is that if the components are the size of atoms, computers can be much faster and more powerfuL Even in the models above, which had only onedimensional memories, it is clear that a megabyte doesn't take up very much space! With atomic-scale separations between the components, clock cycles on the order of femtoseconds (the time it takes light to go 3000 angstroms) are conceivable. As classical cornputen are further and m e r miniaturized, the behavior of their components will have to be analyzed in qoantum mechanical terms, so that in this sense! quantum computers are already approaching.
Parallelism: Quantum computers will be so small that very massive "classical" parallelism (duplication of hardware) will be possible. However, as Deutsch has pointed out, there is a special kind of "quantum parallelism" in which a SINGLE processor can actually carry out parallel computations. Deutsch starts his quantum computer in a superposition of n states conesponding to the computation of f(i) for i = 1 to n. After executing this "program", the computer is in a superposition of "answer states". At most one of these is accessible directly, because the measurement of the answer will "collapse the wave-function"; Deutsch, using the "many-universes" interpretaton of quantum mechanics, regards the computations as taking place in different universes.
However, although we can't directly read all n of the answers, we may be able to compute some function of them by letting them interfere with each other in a fuaher computation! For example, suppose n=2 and we set our quantum computer to simultaneously compute f(1) and f(2) (we shall suppose f is a Boolean function so that f(i) = 0 or 1). ending up in a superposition of two states corresponding to the two "basic" computations. Suppose further that we are not interested in f(1) and f(2) individually, but in the combination f(1) xor f(2). Deutsch shows how to define an observable which, when measured at the end of the computation, will give the outcome "fail" with probability 1/2 and the Outcome f(1) xor f(2) with probability arbitrarily close to 1/2. Thus, if we only have one quantum processor we don't have to compute f(1) and f(2) serially to get the combination f(1) xor f(2): with probability 1f. 2 we can get that answer in half the time by doing both computations in parallel.
Deutsch has shown that any N-fold pdelizable quantum computation (a computation that can be done N times as fast by using N processors instead of 1) can be done N times as fast by a single pmxssor which can obtain the correct answer with probability 1/(NA2 -2N + 2). For example, a computation that can be done in time x using 3 processors can be done in time 3x by a single processor-working serially, while a single processor doing all 3 computations at once will take time x but only return the correct Deutsch proves that this sort of parallelism can never decrease the EXPECTED running time of a computation, but the decrease in ''best-case" mming time can be useful. He gives the following fanciful example: if your computer can predict tomorrow's stock m d e t prices (by a 2-fold parallelkable algorithm) but the computation takes a day and a half, it is better to run the algorithm in parallel--half the time you will get your answer and can make money, and the other half the time you don't get an answer and sit on the sidelines for a day.
is a silly example because it would be simpler to borrow the money to buy a second computer, so as to have the right answer every day and make money twice as fast!) Randomness: There are at least two ways in which the randomness inherent in quantum mechanics makes quantum computers useful. First of all, quantum computers can have "built-in" random number generators. Classical computers must rely on deterministic "pseudo-random number generators", which are necessarily slower (in a quantum computer, generating a random bit is a primitive operation taking one time step, whereas a pseudo-random bit generator must do some computation) and less random. In fact, any given algorithm to generate bits looks non-random for certain applications--the output of such algorithms is not "algorithmically random" (also known as "Chaitin random"), whereas the output of a quantum random number generator almost certainly will be. It is possible to devise problems for which a true "randomized algorithm" will work better than any deterministic algorithm (though these problems are infeasible: not solvable by polynomial-time computations).
The second advantage of quantum randomness is that a quantum computer may generate bits with certah probabilities directly, without any coding. If it is necessary to have a bit which is 1 with probability cosA2 (pi/4) = sqrt (1/2), a classical computer could only do this by a complex process, probably involving the computation of sqrt (2) 
Speedups and complexity:
We have seen how quantum computation allows for certain parallelizable computations to be speeded up in the "best case". It is also true that serial computations on a quantum computer may occasionally go faster than in a classical computer: the computation can "tunnel through". However, this occurs very seldom, and the expected running time remains proportional to that of a classical computer.
It is interesting to ask how the framework of complexity theory can be applied to quantum computers. In particular, what is the right definition of the complexity classes P and NP?
We can define "quantum polynomial time" (QP) as those algorithmic problems which can be solved by a cluantum computer with expected running time bounded by a polynomial in the input size. "Quantum nondeterministic polynomial time" (QNP) consists of those algorithmic problems for which there is a quantum computer program which, given an instance of the problem as input, halts in polynomial time, and retusns a solution with nonzero probability whenever a solution exists. (This definition is not quite right; we should add the condition that the log of the probability be bounded by a polynomial in the input size; otherwise the possibility of "tunneling" would put all quantum computations in the class QNP).
Clearly QP contains P. It is not hard to see that QNP contains Np: given a problem in Np, we can program our quantum computer to guess a solution at random and test it; if there is a solution it will be selected a sufficient €haion of the time. verified, and returned as output Wolfiam, Pitowsky, and others have speculated that QP rnight contain NP: that is, there is some quantum camputer which solves the SatishbiJity problem (or some other NP-complete problem) in polynomial expected running time. If this is proven, it would be ii tremendous breakthrough which would completely redefine our notions of feasible computational problems (and, incidentally, falsify the "complexity version of Church's thesis" defined in section I). The hope is that some way will be found to take advantage of quantum parallelism to "try out all solutions at once".
However, Deutsch's results imply that the obvious way IO do this cannot improve the expected d g time.
Although the P-NP question seems hard for quantum computers too, the NP-COW question has a surprising mwer. For classical computers, the conjectm " " P~N P " says that all tautologies have short proofs:
ithere is some nondeterministic computation which, given a tautology (or a member of some other tcoNP-complete set), will verify that it is a tautology (if it makes the right guesses). Whether a classical computer can do this is questionable, but a quantum cornputer does it easily. Using Deutsch's method, compute in parallel the truth value of the expression in question for all 2% sets of values of the variables and take the logical "and of these 2'h bits. The answer will show up at the end of the computation about one time in (2%)"2. The expected running time is proportional to 2A2n, which compares unfavorably to the serial running time of 2%, but we have Still shown that CONP is contained in QNP. It is not much harder to show that in fact QcoNP=QNP (with QcoNp defined as sets whose complements are in QNP), because a quantum computer can run quantum computations in parallel too.
There are other ways to define quantum complexity classes. For example, we could dehe QNP differently by saying a set is in QNP if each instance has a &on "certificate", which can be verified by a polynomial-time quantum computation that never verifies a certificate for a non-instance. This is moE restrictive than the p~v i m definition because! the certificate is some finite piece of information which can be tzansferred, rather than a lucky sequence of guesses inside the quantum computer.
Quantum complexity theory is stiu in its infancy, but already shows some important differences from the classical theory. -Fault-tolerance: Deutsch has zaddressed the problem of computing in the presence of "noise". Suppose that an N-fold parallelizable function is to be computed, with NR pnx;essors each of which fails w i t h probability p. Qassically, the best solution is to set R processors working on each of the N rasks; the computation fails if and only if all R processors assigned to any one For suitable values of N, P, and R it is better to give each of the NR processors all N tasks in parallel.
Then each processor can fail in two ways (a hardware failure with probability p, or not being lucky enough to have the answer show up), but only one of the NR processors must succeed. For example, take N=R=2, probability 9/16 (each subtask succeeds with probability 3/4 because ooly one of its two processors need work), while the quantum computation succeeds w i t h probability 175/256 (each processor fails with probability 3/4 but for all four to fail only happens 81 times in 256). an improvement of 31/256. Doing physics: We have seen that quantum computers are better than classical computers at simulating quantum systems, and may provide a more natural way to solve certain physical problems than classical computers do. Deutsch's Universal quantum computer can not only simulate classical computers, but also any quantum system with a finitedimensional state space. Deutsch states a generalization of Church's thesis which he calls the Church-Turing 'principle': "Every finitely realizable physical system can be perfectly simulated by a universal model computing machine operating by finite means". He claims this is a physical statement with empirical content, but for it Subtask fail. This occur^ with probability l-(l-p"RPN. p=1/2. The classical computation succeeds witb to be so some universal model computing machine needs to be specified. Deutsch's own model cannot compute any (classically) noncomputable functions, so if his Church-Turing 'principle' refers to his own model then it is false if the classical Church-Turing thesis is. It is conceivable that some "universal quantum computer" can be defined which is also capable of geoerating the "measurable" but not necessarily computable numbers discussed in sections I and II.
The existence of a quantum computer with the capabilities of Deutsch's model has implications for the interpretation of quantum mechanics. It is natural to regard a quantum parallel computation as being split among several "universes"; on those occasions when the computation is successful, the results of the several subcomputations have been correctly combined, so in some sense all of -those universes have contributed to the answer. Deutsch asks "WHERE was all that computation done?" and argues that only the many-universes interpretation provides a satisfactory answer to the question. In another paper mt. J. Theor. Phys. 24 (19851, 13, Deutsch points out that if true "artificial intelligence" programs can be implemented on quantum computers, an experimental test of the "many-universes" interpretation becomes possible.
IV. Is the Universe a Computer?
Why is computation, as we know it, possible? That is, why can we compute certain functions but not others? One can imagine a universe in which far fewer functions are "computable": for example, a cellular automaton with a simple rule iike Fredkh's "mod 2" rule. Such a system is not "computation universal" and can be completely understood by us. We can define model universes in which addition is computable but not multiplication, or in which "primitive recursion" is allowed but not "general recursion" @rimitive recursion requires that all loops be bounded in advance; addition, multiplication, exponentiation, etc. are primitive recursive functions but if the sequence fl(x) = x+x, Q(x) = x*x, D(x) = XAX, fqx) = xAxA ...A x [x times], etc., is defined, the "diagonal" function g(i) = f-i(i) is not primitive recursive).
However, it is hard to imagine intelligent beings in such a universe, because it seems that an "intelligent being" ought to be able to simulate a Turing machine (we certainly can). (Actually, the inhabitants of a universe in which primitive recursion but not general recursion was possible might be interesting, though limited in their capacity for reflection and self-awareness).
A universe in which universal computation is possible can allow the construction of both universal computers and "self-reproducing automata" (also known as Von Neumann machmes).
Von Neumann's original construction of these automata bears a stnlong formal resemblance to the processes of DNA replication and protein synthesis that were discovered a few years later. It seems clear that such universes can have "life" in them, although whether they suffice to suppoxt "intelligent" life is a hotly disputed question [see R.
Penrose, 'The Enperor's New Mind, Oxford University Press 1989).
We can also imagine a universe in which the halting problem was solvable (eariier in this paper we have speculated that our own universe might be like that). Beings in such a universe could, from our point of view, do infiaite computations and know things beyond the reach of our investigations. They might still have their own "unsolvable problems", and might even speculate that a universe l i k e ours in which Diophantine equations can't be solved is too-simple to contain intelligent life as they know it! Fredkin and Toffoli have argued that our Universe may really be a giant cellular antomaton, with some h e d connective topology and transition rule. They have shown [see, for example, T. Toffoli, "How cheap can mechanics' fim principles be?", MIT Lab. for Comp. Sci 19901 that continuity, entropy, relativistic covatiance, and variational principles can emerge naturauy as epiphenomena of an underlying discrete structure such as a cellular automaton. The major &fed of this thesis is that any "local" model cannot reproduce the long-range m l a t i o n s that Bell showed quantum mechanics requixes and Aspect experimentally demonstrated.
[See J. Bell, "Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics", Cambridge University Pres 19873. Until someone shows how the EPR/Bell correlations can emerge from a local model, these models must be regarded as viable universes which, unfortunately, are no( our "the" Universe.
This doesn't mean, though, that the universe is not a computer, just that it's not a classical computer. Feynman's dictum that it shouldn't take an infinite amount of information to &scribe what is going on in a finite region of spacetitne still seems reasonable, and the task before us is to come up with better theories and models, more constructive and finitary in nature but compatible with the quantum world we live in,
